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California Property Tax Exemptions,
Exclusions, Immunities, and Restrictions
on Fair Market Valuation-Or, Whatever
Became of Full Value Assessment?
ALEXANDER H. POPEt
MAX E. GOODRICHt
During the Proposition 13 campaign in 1978, the late Howard
Jarvis was fond of saying that the property tax would generate plenty
of money for the support of local government, despite the one
percent limit specified in his initiative. Taken literally, Mr. Jarvis'
assertion is certainly true. The estimated current fair market value
of privately-owned tangible property in the State of California is in
excess of $1.5 trillion.' Levying a full one percent tax rate on all of
this property would generate over $15 billion-far in excess of the
t Alexander H. Pope received his A.B. from the University of Chicago in 1948 and his
J.D. from the same university in 1952. He has served as Legislative Secretary for former
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr. and as a member of the California Highway Commission
and the Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners. He was the Assessor for Los Angeles
County (1978-86) and is presently a partner of Mayer, Brown and Platt in Los Angeles.
I Max E. Goodrich received his B.A. from California State University, Long Beach in
1961 and his J.D. from Western State University in 1975. He is a Division Chief in the Office
of Assessor, Los Angeles County, and was for seven years responsible for legal and exemption
matters.
1. Publicly-owned and intangible properties are not subject to property taxes in the State
of California. See text accompanying notes 10-14 & 64-73. The total value of privately-owned
tangible property in the State of California was determined by estimating the full value of
such property in Los Angeles County and developing a ratio to the current roll value. That
ratio is 1.58 which, when multiplied against the total state roll of $988 billion, produces a
statewide full value estimate of $1.57 trillion. See 1984-85 CAL. ST. BD. EQUAL. ANN. REP.,
Table 5 [hereinafter cited as SBE ANN. REP.].
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estimated $10 billion in property tax collected by all California
counties in the 1985-86 fiscal year, 2 and more than enough to cover
all the costs of so-called property related services, for which property
taxes have been the traditional source of support.
However, as the $5 billion difference between those numbers
demonstrates, today's California property tax system comes nowhere
near generating the amount of revenue that a flat one percent tax
rate would produce without existing exemptions, exclusions, and
special valuation rules. Throughout its history, the California prop-
erty tax system has accumulated an incredible number of these
exemptions and exclusions which greatly reduce the amount of rev-
enue generated. In addition, the roll-back and freeze provisions of
section 2 of Proposition 13 itself massively restrict the application
of its one percent limit (especially in light of the liberal interpretations
adopted by the Legislature and the State Board of Equalization
(hereinafter State Board) in their implementation of section 2).
In fact, the history of California property tax law has been a long
process of reducing the property tax base through constitutional
amendments, legislative enactments, State Board rules, and court in-
terpretations.3 If the process continues unabated, by the end of the
century we may have more value exempt than on the assessment rolls.
The purpose of this article is to summarize briefly the scope of these
exemptions and other limitations, to illustrate some of the problems
inherent in the administration of our current property tax exemption
system, and to make some recommendations for reform of that system.
I. OuR EVER-EXPANDING EXEMPTIONS
A. Prior to 1930
California's first constitution, adopted in 1849, broadly stated that
"Taxation shall be equal and uniform.. ."I California's first Legislature
2. This estimate is based on the 1984-85 revenue factored by the increase in net taxable
value for 1985-86. SBE ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 40.
3. In § 6.5 of their classic work on California property taxes, Kenneth Ehrman and
Sean Flavin list four principle reasons for exempting property: Administrative convenience(low value property), use in providing services the government might otherwise have to supply(Welfare Exemption), subsidizing favored economic activity (fishing boats), or substitution of
an alternative method of taxation (personal property of financial institutions). K. EHRMAN &S. FLA v N, TAxiNG CALIFoRNIA PROPERTY § 6.5, at 142-43 (2d ed. 1979). To these might be
added: Elimination of taxes perceived to be onerous (Proposition 13), and assistance to
organizations engaged in moral and spiritual activities (Church and Religious Exemptions).
4. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 13 (1849, repealed 1879).
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nevertheless exempted property used for churches, cemeteries, librar-
ies, and scientific institutions 5 but in 1868 the California Supreme
Court struck down these exemptions in People v. McCreery.6 The
amended Constitution of 1879 left out the "equal and uniform"
requirement for ad valorem taxation and exempted growing crops,
public schools, and government-owned property. 7 A constitutional
amendment in 1894 exempted public libraries, free museums, fruit
and nut-bearing trees, and grapevines."
This began an ever-expanding series of constitutional amendments
and legislative enactments to exempt or exclude property from tax-
ation. Early in this century additional exemptions were added for
churches in 1900, veterans in 1911, vessels and colleges in 1914,
orphanages in 1920, and immature trees and cemeteries in 1926. 9
B. Personal Property
In 1933, a constitutional amendment gave the Legislature authority
to exempt personal property from taxation.10 This authority was used
by the Legislature to exempt possessory interests in personal property
(1941) and individually-owned personal property (1969)." All business
inventory was exempted in 1980.12 Essentially, the only tangible
personal property left on the assessment roll is business machinery
and equipment, boats, and airplanes (plus "in lieu" taxation of
motor vehicles).
5. 1850 Cal. Stat. ch. 52, sec. 5.
6. 34 Cal. 432 (1868).
7. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1879, amended 1894); 1880 Cal. Am. Code ch. 31, at 5
(amending CAL. POL. CODE §§ 3607-3861) (code sections are statutory enactments implementing
the constitutional provisions).
8. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1894, amended 1910); 1895 Cal. Stat. ch. 218, at 304
(amending CAL. POL. CODE §§ 3607-3900) (code sections are statutory enactments implementing
the constitutional provisions).
9. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1 (1900, amended 1952); 1903 Cal. Stat. ch. 18, at 21
(enacting CAL. POL. CODE § 3611) (churches). CAL. CoNsT. art XIII, § 1 4 (1911, amended
1944); 1915 Cal. Stat. ch. 178, at 351 (enacting CAL. POL. CODE § 3612) (veterans). CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § la (1914, amended 1952); 1915 Cal. Stat. ch. 629, sec. 1, at 1216 (enacting
CAL. POL. CODE § 3613) (colleges). CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (1914, amended 1932); 1943
Cal. Stat. ch. 994, at 2910 (enacting CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 209.5); CAL. REv. & TAX.
CODE § 209 (enacted 1939) (vessels). CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1/2 (1920); 1939 Cal. Stat. ch.
154, sec. 207, at 1282 (enacting CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 207) (orphanages). CAL. CoNST.
art. XIII, § 123/ (1894, amended 1926); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 211 (enacted 1939)
(immature trees). CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § lb (1926); CAL. REv. &TAX. CODE § 204 (cemeteries).
10. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14 (1910, amended 1933) (current version is CAL. CONST.
art. XIII, § 2).
11. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 107, 224 (vest 1970).
12. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 219 (West 1970).
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With regard to intangible personal property, the only categories
ever subject to tax, such as solvent credits, notes, debenture bonds,
deeds of trust, and mortgages, had all been exempted by 1967."1 In
addition, the intangible value of much tangible property has been
exempted. In 1968 the value of movie prints was restricted to the
value of the film, and in 1972 the value of computer software was
restricted to the value of the material on which it is recorded. 4
C. The Welfare Exemption
In 1944 the voters approved a constitutional amendment establish-
ing a broad Welfare Exemption. The original language of the Ex-
emption read as follows:
In addition to such exemptions as are now provided in this Con-
stitution, the Legislature may exempt from taxation all or any
portion of property used exclusively for religious, hospital or char-
itable purposes and owned by community chests, funds, foundations
or corporations organized and operated for religious, hospital or
charitable purposes, not conducted for profit and no part of the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual. 5
The history of the Exemption has been one of legislative expansion
and broad interpretation by the courts. As currently set forth in
sections 214-214.13 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, the Welfare
Exemption today accounts for the bulk of exempt property in the
State of California. 6
1. Nonprofit Requirement
The constitution and section 214 are very clear that only property
owned and used by nonprofit organizations is to be exempt. Neither
operating profits nor the property remaining upon termination of
the nonprofit use may inure to the benefit of any individual. 7
13. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1879); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 212 (West 1970).
14. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 988, 995 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
15. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § IC (1944). The current exemption is found in California
Constitution article XIII, § 4.
16. See infra note 46.
17. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 214(2), (6) (vest 1970). See also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 214.3 (West 1970). That section provides that property used solely for charitable or hospital
use for a minimum period of 30 years shall qualify for the Welfare Exemption irrespective of
any reversionary provision in the title of the property regarding liquidation, dissolution, or
abandonment. The State Board staff is unaware of any instance in which property owners
have taken advantage of this provision.
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Initially, section 214 denied the exemption where the exempt prop-
erty itself was operated at a profit even though the profit might be
devoted entirely to the exempt activity.' 8 The Legislature later loosened
that restriction, and today profit may be derived as long as it is an-
cillary to the overall charitable thrust of the activities.' 9
2. Exclusivity Requirement
The second major requirement of both the constitution and section
214 is that exempt property be used "exclusively" for the exempt
purpose. This requirement has been liberally construed by the Cali-
fornia courts. "Exclusive" is not accorded the dictionary meaning
of "sole." Commercial uses are permitted as long as the primary
use is for the exempt purpose.20 Perhaps the most extreme application
of this principle occurred in San Francisco Boys' Club v. County of
Mendocino.21 In that case, almost 2000 acres of property owned by
the Boys' Club was held to be exempt despite the fact that the
property was used by the Club for camping purposes only during ten
weeks in the summer, and two-thirds of the property was used for
logging during the rest of the year.
In addition, exempt organizations are allowed to separate out their
nonexempt activities and preserve the exemption for the balance of
the property. This practice was approved by the California Supreme
Court in two 1950 cases, Y.M.C.A. v. County of Los Angeles,22 and
18. 1945 Cal. Stat. ch 241, sec. 1, at 706 (enacting CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 214(3)).
The original language contained the following restriction: "The property is not used or operated
by the owner or by any other person for profit regardless of the purposes to which the profit
is devoted." Id. Sutter Hospital in Sacramento was denied its exemption on this basis, and
the denial was upheld by the courts. Sutter Hospital v. City of Sacramento, 39 Cal. 2d 33,
244 P.2d 390 (1952).
19. A 1953 statute substituted the present provisions of § 214(a)(3) for former Revenue
and Taxation Code § 214(1). For hospitals, this rule is quantified by Revenue and Taxation
Code § 214(a)(1), which provides that a hospital shall not be deemed to be organized for
profit unless operating revenues (exclusive of gifts, endowments and grants-in-aid) exceed 110%
of operating expenses. 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 730, sec. 1, at 1994.
20. Peninsula Covenant Church v. County of San Mateo, 94 Cal. App. 3d 382, 396, 156
Cal. Rptr. 431, 438 (1979). As put by the court in that case:
The word "exclusively" as used in section 214 generally means solely. While the
courts have not defined "exclusive use" in such a restrictive manner, we believe that
the clear meaning of section 214 is that, at the very least, the exempt purpose must
be the primary use made of the property.
Id.
21. 254 Cal. App. 2d 548, 62 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1967).
22. 35 Cal. 2d 760, 221 P.2d 47 (1950).
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Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los Angeles.23 A 1968
amendment to section 214 recognizes the permissibility of segregation
by requiring that exempt property be "used for the actual operation
of the exempt activity and.., not exceed an amount of the property
reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the exempt pur-
pose. "24
3. Use Requirements
A third major Welfare Exemption requirement is that the property
be used for hospital, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. 2
Only the hospital category has (so far) been free of controversy.
"Religious" uses are not as easy to define. To begin with, under
our doctrine of the separation of church and state, it is not consti-
tutionally permissible to inquire into the truth of religious beliefs, 26
and the State Board guidelines in this area are necessarily very broad. 2
An equally difficult problem, raised recently in the Legislature, is
whether or not religious organizations can constitutionally be required
to file claim forms in order to secure the exemption of their pro-
perty. Current legislation does require minimal reporting from all
religious organizations claiming an exemption.2" The judicial rationale
for requiring reporting by religious organizations, and allowing in-
quiry to determine the accuracy of that reporting, is that such re-
quirements constitute only an incidental burden on the exercise of
religion.29 In any case, current statutes and State Board guidelines
23. 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221 P.2d 31 (1950).
24. CAL. Rv. & TAX. CODE § 214(3) (West Supp. 1987).
25. Although the general language of Revenue and Taxation Code § 214 includes "sci-
entific" purposes, organizations attempting to qualify for the Welfare Exemption based on
the use of property for scientific purposes must demonstrate that they meet all of the
requirements for the exemption of charitable organizations. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214(a)(7)
(West 1970).
26. Saint Germain Found. v. County of Siskiyou, 212 Cal. App. 2d 911, 28 Cal. Rptr.
393 (1963). See Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 693,
315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957).
27. See STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ASSESSOR HANDBOOK, AH 267-WELFARE EXEMP-
TIONS (Dec. 1985). State Board, Letter to Assessors: 1986 Exemption Guidelines, 86/55 (July
30, 1986) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
28. In 1981 the Legislature added Revenue and Taxation Code § 257 which eliminated
the need for annual filing. CAL. Rv. & TAX. CODE § 257 (XVest Supp. 1986). New Revenue
and Taxation Code § 207 also streamlined the claims process for churches and church schools
that were formerly required to file both a Welfare Exemption claim for the school and a
Church Exemption claim for the church. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 207 (West Supp. 1987).
29. Society of Krishna Consciousness v. County to Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App. 3d 582
(1980) (decision not officially published). The court stated that the filing requirements were
"but an incidental burden on the Society's exercise of its religion, which burden the Society
may avoid by not claiming the welfare exemption with regard to its property." Id. at 590.
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appear to set forth workable solutions to most of the potentially sen-
sitive problems that arise in this area.3"
Defining "charitable purposes" has been a much more difficult
problem. In Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los Angeles,31
the California Supreme Court came down on the side of a strict con-
struction of the Welfare Exemption. However, the Court went on to
say that "strict" does not mean "narrow," but rather "fair and
reasonable. ' 3 2 The supreme court in Y.M.C.A. v. County of Los
Angeles33 rejected the narrow concept of charity-'"as confined solely
to the relief of the needy" in favor of a broader interpretation "com-
prehending as well activities which are humanitarian in nature and
rendered for the general improvement and betterment of mankind." 3
In Lundberg v. County of Alameda,15 the opinion by Chief Justice
Gibson comes full circle and gives a "broad construction" to the word
"charitable" in a case upholding the constitutionality of a new provi-
sion of section 214 which exempted certain educational institutions.36
In cases involving activities which might otherwise have been the
responsibility of local government, such as primary and secondary
education and care of the aged, the courts have upheld exemptions
even where some of the individual beneficiaries were middle and
upper class persons able to pay substantial fees for the services
involved.17 In another line of cases, generally involving activities open
to the public, the courts have extended the meaning of "charitable"
30. The potential abuse of the Church Exemption (Revenue and Taxation Code § 206) is
highlighted in the contradictory history of the exemption status of the Universal Life Church,
famous for its mail-order ministers. The church was originally granted a federal income tax
exemption in 1976, after the United States District Court recognized the tenets of the Church
as "religious." Universal Life Church v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. .1974).
Ten years later, the Internal Revenue Service removed the church from its list of exempt organiza-
tions and contributions to the Church are no longer deductible. See Lowe, IRS Snuffs Out
Tax Exemption for Mail Order Religious Titles, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Aug. 29, 1984,
at 3, col. 5-6.
31. 35 Cal. 2d 729, 735, 221 P.2d 31 (1950).
32. Id. at 735, 221 P.2d at 35.
33. 35 Cal. 2d 760, 221 P.2d 47 (1950).
34. Id. at 768, 221 P.2d at 52. A recent newspaper article points out that only about
10% of the "charities" exempt for federal income tax purposes by the Internal Revenue
Service are primarily concerned with aiding the poor. Johnson, IRS Seeks to Impose Curbs
on Lobbying by Charities, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 5-6.
35. 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1956).
36. Id. at 651, 298 P.2d at 6.
37. Fredericka Home for the Aged v. County of San Diego, 35 Cal. 2d 789, 221 P.2d
68 (1950); Sarah Dix Hamlin School v. City & County of San Francisco, 221 Cal. App. 2d
336, 34 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1963); Fifield Manor v. County of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. App. 2d 1,
10 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1961).
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under the Welfare Exemption to include many types of activities that
promote the "general welfare" of the community. For example, in
Stockton Civic Theatre v. Board of Supervisors,3" a community
theater presenting amateur theatricals was found by the supreme
court to be charitable, and the Court of Appeals for the Second District
approved an exemption for the very professional productions of Los
Angeles' Greek Theatre.39
A paragraph in a 1979 opinion by Justice Feinberg 4O sums up the
current law as follows:
From these decisions, two dependent variables emerge as particularly
important to the determination of the court: the nature of the use
of property, and the degree to which the activity is open to the
community as a whole. If the use is one which is deemed particularly
necessary to the welfare of the community or is a service which the
government otherwise would be compelled to provide for the com-
munity, such as a hospital or elementary school, it may be consid-
ered a charitable purpose even though only a small number of
people are directly benefited. If, on the other hand, the activity
serves educational or humanitarian goals and is open to all or
virtually all of the community, it may be exempt even though there
are significant collateral benefits, such as amusement and entertain-
ment.4
1
4. Incidental Uses
A final problem area in Welfare Exemption interpretation arises
in connection with property uses not in themselves charitable but
38. 66 Cal. 2d 13, 423 P.2d 810 (1967).
39. Greek Theatre v. County of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. App. 3d 768, 142 Cal. Rptr. 919(1978). In the closing paragraphs of his opinion, Justice Thompson stated: "While the judicialpyramid does not permit us to do so . . . , there is reason to reconsider the broad scope of
the rule of Stockton Civic Theatre .... If we wre not precluded . . ., we would apply a
narrower test of charitable activity .. " Id. at 784, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 927.40. Peninsula Covenant Church v. County of San Mateo, 94 Cal. App. 3d 382, 399, 156
Cal. Rptr. 431, 440 (1979) (citations omitted).
41. Id. A different analysis of the requirements of the Welfare Exemption is containedin a decision of the State Board, In re Crystal Cathedral of the Reformed Church in America,
Cal. St. Bd. Equal. (Feb. 29, 1984) (copy on file at Paci/c Law Journal). The opinion
of the State Board majroity in that case makes competition with commercial enterprises
the critical factor in determining the availability of the Welfare Exemption. With all due
respect, this is a unique and probably erroneous view of the law-as the dissent by StateBoard Member William Bennett vigorously asserts. If competition were the key, the current
effort by health club owners to seek the revocation of the exemptions granted to various
Y.M.C.A.s with similar health facilities would have a great likelihood of success. In fact, it
would be surprising to see the Y.M.C.A.s lose their exempt status with the law as it stands
today. Neither the State Board staff nor any of the affected assessors have shown anyinclination to change the exempt status quo with regard to existing Y.M.C.A. programs and
facilities.
950
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which are, once again in the language of the Y.M.C.A opinion,
"incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
its exempt purposes."
42
Many of the cases involving "incidental uses" concern residential
property occupied by persons engaged in charitable and religious
activities. In the Y.M.C.A. case the supreme court exempted dor-
mitory facilities as being "reasonably necessary" in carrying out the
Y.M.C.A.'s program "directed to the elevation and betterment of
young men and boys, ' 43 and in Cedars of Lebanon housing facilities
for the hospital staff were similarly found to be exempt. 4
In addition to the broad sweep of the judicial interpretations set
forth above, the Legislature has also been at work. Numerous specific
exemptions of particular activities similar to those covered by the
Welfare Exemption have been added to the Revenue and Taxation
Code. A current State Board publication on exemptions lists 63
separate exemptions, most of them covering the property of various
types of nonprofit activity felt by the Legislature to be sufficiently
beneficial to the public to warrant a property tax exemption.45 The
revenue loss for any specific exemption always sounds small in
relation to the public benefit provided. However, in toto, the Welfare
Exemption and its narrower counterparts involve in excess of $200
million in potential revenue. 4
6
II. VALUATION RESTRICTIONS (PROPOSITION 13)
For most of California's history, residential property taxes have
not been a major political problem. Prior to World War II home
42. Y.M.C.A. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 760, 771, 221 P.2d 47, 51 (1950).
43. Id. at 767, 221 P.2d at 52.
44. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221 P.2d 31
(1950).
45. State Board, Letter to Assessors: 1986 Exemption Guideines, 86/55, at 2, 227 (July
30, 1986) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal). A similar letter summarizing all current
exemptions is issued by the State Board annually.
46. As shown in Table 8 of the 1984-85 State Board Annual Report, the current assessed
value of charitable and religious exempt property is approximately $19 billion, broken down
as follows:
Type Exempt Amount
Welfare $11,726,057,000
Religious 3,519,384,000
College 3,073,636,000
Church 668,016,000
SBE ANN. REP., supra note 1, at A-8, A-9. These numbers, however, are based on historical
values for the properties in question, many of them decades old. No effort is made in most
assessors' offices to estimate the current fair market value of such exempt property.
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ownership was at lower levels than is true today, and informal split
rolls (not to mention occasional outright corruption) generally kept
taxes on single-family residences at comparatively low levels. Even
after World War II, the tremendous volume of home building kept
prices low, and the increase in residential property taxes during the
1950s and 1960s was actually below the rate of inflation. Since that
time and prior to 1978, however, residential inflation has soared and
property tax "reforms," together with computerized procedures and
better administration, resulted in rapidly rising property taxes for
homeowners.
In an effort to deal with this problem, the Legislature, in 1968,
put on the ballot a constitutional amendment creating a $3000
Homeowners' Exemption. This amendment was overwhelmingly ap-
proved by the voters, as was a similar amendment in 1974 to increase
the Homeowners' Exemption to $7000. 47
As residential inflation increased during the late 1970s, property
tax relief for homeowners became an overriding political issue, 48
especially since a growing state surplus provided the wherewithal for
the Governor and the Legislature to deal with the problem. Relief
was not provided and the Jarvis-Gann Initiative (Proposition 13),
was the result. The proposition passed overwhelmingly in 1978 despite
the dire predictions from opponents of the drastic impact the initiative
would have on local government. 49
Section 1 of Proposition 13, limiting property tax rates in Cali-
fornia to one percent, is its best known provision and is the primary
reason for the drastic drop in property tax revenues.5 0 The average
property tax rate in the State prior to 1978 was 2.67/0. 11 Less well
understood, but equally significant over the long-run, was section 2
of the Proposition which restricted the manner of appraising Cali-
47. The current provisions of the Homeowner's Exemption are contained in article XIII,§ 3(k) of the California Constitution. This exemption was created by Propositions la (1969)
and 6 (1974). These Propositions were placed on the ballot as the legislative response to effortsby former Los Angeles County Assessor Philip E. Watson to put a cap on property tax rates(Proposition 9 in 1968 and Proposition 14 in 1972) and by then-Governor Ronald Reagan to
establish a limit on State revenue (Proposition 8 in 1974).
48. For example, in his 1977 State of the State Message, Governor Edmund G. Brown,
Jr. made property tax reform number one on his legislative agenda. Report to the Legislature,
Ass'y J., 1977-78, Jan. 6, 1977, at 159.
49. The Proposition 13 vote was 4,188,953 in favor and 2,281,888 against. It comprises
article XIIIA of the California Constitution.
50. Total California property tax revenues in 1977-78 were approximately $10.3 billion.
The revenue in 1978-79 was only $5 billion. SBE ANN. REP., supra note I, at 40.
51. SBE ANN. RP., supra note 1, at 40.
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fornia property for assessment purposes. Assessed values were rolled
back to their 1975 levels with provision for a maximum two percent
annual inflation increase. Only newly constructed properties, or those
with ownership changes, are reappraised and assessed at their current
fair market value.
Not to be outdone, the Legislature has enacted a number of
exclusions from the change-in-ownership reappraisal requirement of
Proposition 13 .52 These "exemptions" have been created despite
having no specific basis in the language of the Proposition and
despite the long-established rule that the Legislature does not have
the authority to create real property exemptions.53 These exemptions
are of doubtful constitutionality, despite an Attorney General's opin-
ion supporting certain exemptions created shortly after the passage
of Proposition 13.1 4
At the State Board level, utilities and oil companies have not fared
as well as other taxpayers in the rules adopted by the State Board
for the implementation of Proposition 13. The State Board has been
steadfast in its opposition to the efforts of the owners of state-
assessed properties, primarily public utilities, to secure the protection
of section 2 of Proposition 13, despite initial language of the Prop-
osition which appears to exclude them from its coverage. The supreme
court upheld the State Board's position on this issue.5 5 The State
Board adopted a middle position with regard to the procedure for
assessing hydrocarbon reserves under Proposition 13, in the face of
legal attacks by both oil companies and assessors asserting positions
more favorable to their interests. Again, the State Board prevailed
in court.5 6 In other areas, State Board rules and guidelines frequently
follow the tendency of the Legislature to favor taxpayers in dealing
with situations not specifically covered by statute.
5 7
52. There are 23 specific exclusions. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 61-69 (West Supp. 1987).
See Pope, Proposition 13: An Administrative Nightmare, Los ANGELES LAW., Oct. 1981, at
10.:
53. Article XIII, section I requires that all property be taxed, "unless otherwise provided
by this constitution or the laws of the United States." CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1894).
Consequently, the Legislature has no authority to exempt real property. McKay v. San Francisco,
113 Cal. 392 (1896). See also CAL. Ray. & TAx. CODE § 201 (West 1970). The Legislature has
express authority to exempt personal property. See text accompanying notes 10-14.
54. 63 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1980). See Morris, Proposition 13: Constitutional Problems,
Los ANGELES LAW., Oct. 1981, at 11.
55. ITT World Communications, Inc. v. County of San Francisco, 37 Cal. 3d 859, 210
Cal. Rptr. 226 (1985).
56. Lynch v. Board of Equalization, 164 Cal. App. 3d 94, 210 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1985).
57. For example, State Board rule 462(1)(3) expands the interspousal transfer exclusion
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This favorable Legislative-State Board climate for taxpayers under
Proposition 13 has resulted in a relatively small amount of litigation
with regard to the assessment aspects of Proposition 13. The reported
cases have generally supported the legislative and State Board im-
plementation provisions. The constitutionality of the roll-back and
freeze provisions of section 2 was upheld in Amador Valley Joint
Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization.5" In
addition to the cases upholding the State Board interpretations of
the Proposition discussed above, Los Angeles County was unsuc-
cessful in its effort to overturn a State Board staff letter spelling out
procedures favorable to taxpayers involved in multi-year construction
projects.59
Although Proposition 13 is by far the most important in terms of
impact on assessed value, it is by no means the only significant restric-
tion on the use of fair market value as the standard for the assess-
ment of California property. The Williamson Act, adopted in 1965,
restricts the valuation of much open space, including agricultural land,
to use value.60 Timber has been taken off the assessment rolls and
replaced by a yield tax on harvested trees.6 In addition, there are
valuation restrictions on nonprofit golf courses,6" historically signifi-
cant properties,63  enforceably restricted properties, 64 single-family
residences in commercial zones, 65 and properties subject to wildlife
habitat contracts."
III. IMMUNE PROPERTY (PUBLIC OWNERSHIP)
A final concept that greatly affects the overall impact of Califor-
nia's property tax is the concept of immunity for publicly-owned
of Revenue and Taxation Code § 63 to include transfers pursuant to post-divorce amendments
to marital settlement agreements. Similarly, a December 18, 1984 letter from State Board staff
to the Los Angeles County Office of Assessor attaches a memorandum concluding that the
transfer of valuable development rights between adjacent land owners is not a change in
ownership, although the transfer of easements or water rights would involve a reappraisable
change. One State Board member was heard to remark, during a discussion of these issues,
that the voters had voted for low taxes in 1978 and that therefore disputes arising in the
implementation of Proposition 13 should generally be resolved in favor of lower taxes. (State
Board rules are found in the California Administrative Code, Title 18).
58. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281 (1978).
59. Pope v. State Bd. of Equalization, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 194 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1982).
For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 93-96.
60. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 8; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (West 1983). See CAL.
Rv. & TAx. CODE § 421 (West Supp. 1987).
61. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 30); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 423.5 (West 1970).
62. CA. CONST. art. XIII, § 10; CAL. REv. & Tax. CODE § 52 (West Supp. 1987).
63. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII,-§ 8; CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 439-439.4 (West Supp. 1987).
64. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 402.1 (West Supp. 1987).
65. CA. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 9; CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 401.4 (West Supp. 1987).
66. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 8; CA. REV. & TAx. CODE § 423.7 (West Supp. 1987).
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property. As a general rule, all publicly-owned property is immune
(under the provisions of the United States Constitution) or exempt
(under the provisions of the California Constitution) from property
taxation in the State of California. Federally-owned property is
immune from state and local taxation unless expressly waived by an
act of Congress. 67 Similarly, the California Constitution exempts all
property owned by the State or by local government bodies. 68 The
only exception is for land owned by a local government outside its
own boundaries.6 9 Over fifty percent of the land area of the State
of California escapes property tax due to these immunities.
The immunity of publicly held property is well understood and
generally does not cause major problems in the administration of the
property tax in California. Two peripheral areas do, however, raise
significant issues. The first such area is the concept of "possessory
interests" in publicly-owned property. Under California law, when
a private party owns a leasehold interest in publicly-owned real
property, the value of that lease is subject to property tax.70 The
longer the lease, the closer the value of the "possessory interest" to
the value of the underlying publicly-owned fee.7 ' The term contained
in the lease document is normally used in determining the value of
the possessory interest. However, State Board rule 23 sets forth a
number of factors which may be used by assessors to find different
"reasonably anticipated terms" under appropriate circumstances. In
the only appellate court case involving rule 23, the trial court and
the court of appeals rejected the use by the assessor of a longer term
than provided in the leases of ten airlines, at Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport, on the basis of the facts presented to the Appeals
67. See K. Emu.iAN & S. FLAvIN, supra note 3, § 5.2.
68. CAL. Co NsT. art. XIII, § 3.
69. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 11. See also CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 987 (West Supp.
1987). In past years Los Angeles and San Francisco acquired substantial amounts of land in
Inyo, Mono and Tuolume Counties to obtain the appurtenant water rights and thereby secure
additional water supplies. These acquisitions removed much value from the assessment rolls
of those counties. Section 11 was enacted primarily to restore their tax bases. See K. EHMA.N
& S. FLAVIN, supra note 3, § 6.11.
70. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 107 (West Supp. 1987). It has been held that Revenue
and Taxation § 107 does not apply to possessory interests in personal property. General
Dynamics Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d 794 (1958). This omission
is of great significance to California's defense industry, which uses large amounts of govern-
ment-owned tools, equipment, and materials.
71. The basic case upon which current State Board valuation rules are based is De Luz
Homes v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955). The De Luz approach,
basing valuation on exchange value rather than use value, may result in adjoining fee owners,
short-term lessees and long-term lessees in possession of parcels having the same value paying
substantially different amounts of property tax.
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Board.72 This case has not been well received by assessors, and State
Board rule 23 continues to require use of the "reasonably anticipated
term" standard in appropriate circumstances. 71
The other major problem area with regard to immunities arises
under the commerce clause and the export-import clause of the United
States Constitution. Under those clauses, goods moving in interstate
or foreign commerce are not subject to property taxes. In Low v.
Austin,74 the California Supreme Court had allowed California's
property tax to apply to imported goods. This action was reversed
on appeal to the United States Supreme Court which interpreted the
export-import clause as banning the property taxation of imported
goods. A century later, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,7. the
Supreme Court overruled the Low case and held that nondiscimina-
tory property taxes may be applied to imported goods as soon as
they leave the stream of transportation. The courts have interpreted
transit immunity narrowly; only goods actively moving in interstate
or foreign commerce, or at least committed to a carrier for that
purpose, are immune from property tax. 76
IV. THE CURRENT SYSTEM IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE NIGHTMARE
In theory, California's property tax system has a well-structured
procedure for spelling out the details of the exemptions, exclusions
and special valuation rules contained in articles XIII and XIIIA of
the California Constitution. The courts, of course, have the final say
as to the interpretation of those constitutional provisions. Basic
statutory provisions are set forth in the Revenue and Taxation Code. 77
More detail is supplied, and gaps are filled, by rules adopted by the
State Board. These rules have the force of law and are binding on
both assessors and assessment appeals boards. 78 The State Board also
72. American Airlines, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 3d 325, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 261 (1976).
73. CAL. ST. BD. EQUAL. PROP. TAx R. 23, CAL. ADmwN. CODE tit. 18, § 23 (1987). InTodd Shipyards v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2, Civ. Case No. C505-511 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct., July 10, 1984), a Superior Court applied the "reasonably anticipated term"
standard of rule 23. See State Board, Letter to Assessors: The Ramifications of American
Airlines, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles Decision, 77/52 (Mar. 28, 1977) (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal).
74. 80 U.S. 29 (1872).
75. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
76. See K. EHRmAN & S. FiAviN, supra note 3, § 5.8.
77. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 60-69. 70-74, 201-234 (West Supp. 1987).
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15606 (West Supp. 1987). CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 538 (West
Supp. 1987) requires assessors to seek declaratory relief from the courts should they disagree
with the rules and procedures of the State Board.
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prescribes the content of forms used by assessors, issues detailed
instructions to them in the interest of promoting statewide uniformity
in assessment practices, and surveys each assessor's office on a regular
basis to insure compliance with State requirements.7 9 In contrast to
valuation decisions, with respect to which assessors and county
appeals boards have the final say, the State Board is the final
authority with regard to the Welfare Exemption. An assessor cannot
approve a Welfare Exemption denied by the State Board. However,
an assessor may deny an exemption despite a contrary State Board
opinion. 0 As a practical matter, State Board staff opinions are given
great weight in making Welfare Exemption decisions at the local
level.
Despite this fine-sounding procedure, and the centralized appellate
authority of the State Board over the Welfare Exemption, the existing
system of exemptions, exclusions, immunities, and valuation restric-
tions is a haphazard morass.8" As described below, the concepts are
often vague, at other times technical and arbitrary, and all too fre-
quently complex and overlapping. In toto, they can be a trap for
the unwary and particular applications need to be reviewed in detail
(often in consultation with local and State Board staff) before a final
determination can be made.
A. Vague
Perhaps the premier example of vagueness in California property
tax exemption law is the concept of "charitable" in the Welfare
Exemption. As indicated above, the courts have given the concept a
liberal interpretation, and, in a number of cases, have gone even
further to allow exemptions to property used for purposes not
charitable in themselves but "incidental" to the accompanying char-
itable use. This, obviously, adds a second uncertain level to an
already vague concept.
The courts have recently had difficulty in applying these principles
to parsonages and the living quarters of religious devotees. In Serra
Retreat v. County of Los Angeles,82 the California Supreme Court
applied the Welfare Exemption to exempt the residential quarters of
79. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15606, 15608, 15640-15644 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
80. CAL. Rav. & TAX. CODE § 254.5 (vest Supp. 1987).
81. For an excellent overview of the present system, see K. EHRMAu & S. FLAvIN, supra
note 3, chs. 5 & 6.
82. 35 Cal. 2d 755, 221 P.2d 59 (1950).
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Franciscan priests and lay-brothers who operated a laymen's religious
retreat house. In dicta, the Court distinguished "parsonage cases
where the provision of housing for the pastor or minister on church
property does not stem from claims of institutional necessity as
contrasted with mere considerations of residential convenience.''83
That dicta has been followed to deny exemption to parsonages, and
is contained in current State Board guidelines.84
However, in First United Methodist Church v. County of Los
Angeles,85 the court of appeal overruled the State Board and the trial
court and granted an exemption to two parsonages owned by the
Methodist Church and furnished to its ministers. That opinion fo-
cused on the Church's use of the houses to further its purposes and
treated the residential use by the ministers as secondary. A hearing
was denied by the supreme court, but the opinion was ordered
depublished. In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.
County of Los Angeles,86 the second district allowed an exemption
for the living quarters of Hare Krishna devotees despite their working
time being spent primarily on nonexempt publishing activities. Again,
the supreme court denied a hearing, but ordered that the opinion
not be officially published.
Just what message the supreme court is trying to convey here is
not entirely clear. The results in these cases turn on whether the
residential (incidental) use is looked at from the point of view of the
exempt organization or from the viewpoint of the employee-benefi-
ciary. At some point the supreme court (or the Legislature) needs to
resolve the issue in a definitive manner. In the meantime, these cases
are an invitation for all similarly situated taxpayers to question the
State Board guidelines8 7 and file appeals if assessors continue to deny
their exemptions. 8
83. Id. at 759, 221 P.2d at 61.
84. See STATE BOARD, PROPERTY TAX INFORMATION FOR CHURCH EXEMPTIONS, RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE WELFARE EXEMPTION, at 10 (Aug. 1985) (copy
on file at Pacific Law Journal).
85. 161 Cal. App. 3d 1091 (1984) (decision not officially published).
86. 112 Cal. App. 3d 582 (1980) (decision not officially published).
87. The State Board has advised assessors to continue to use its existing guidelines. State
Board, Letter to Assessors Only, CAO 85/05 (Mar. 26, 1985) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal).
88. Another residential exemption problem illustrates the lack of uniformity that often
results from the vagueness of the applicable rules. At present, the practice with regard to the
residences of college and university presidents varies widely from county to county. In LosAngeles County, all are exempt (despite an abortive effort made 10 years ago to include all
such residences on the roll). Among the other large counties checked, two have them on the
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Another source of vagueness in property tax law is the language
of Proposition 13.89 Less than 400 words long, the Proposition totally
revolutionized California assessment practices with the imposition of
value ceilings that change only when there is "new construction" or
a "change in ownership." Applying these general concepts to a
complex commercial society has been a difficult task for California
lawmakers. For example, how does the concept of "new construc-
tion" (or "change in ownership") apply to the assessment of hydro-
carbon reserves? Exploration is done, new deposits are located, wells
are drilled, oil and gas is brought to the surface and removed,
deposits move underground, water injection and other secondary and
tertiary recovery methods take place, wells are capped and aban-
doned, new technologies for recovery are developed, and (perhaps
most difficult of all to quantify and assess) estimated reserves are
adjusted upward and downward as the fluctuating price of oil influ-
ences the amount of underground deposits that are cost-effective to
produce. After the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, many assessors
took the position that the multifarious activities taking place in the
oil and gas fields amounted to continuous new construction which
warranted reappraising hydrocarbon reserves annually. Some oil and
gas producers, on the other hand, argued that all the oil and gas
underground was in existence in 1978, and that when oil and gas
equal to the assessed value in that year had been pumped up, the
assessment should drop to zero. Not willing to take a position in
this dispute between the oil companies and local government, the
Legislature failed to take action. It was not until the following year
that the State Board completed rule 468 instructing assessors on how
to handle oil and gas reserves. Rule 468 takes a middle position
between the oil companies and assessors, directing assessors to value
existing reserves at the 1975 level but allowing them to add new
reserves at current values, including those resulting from changes in
the price of oil. The rule was attacked both by the oil industry and
many assessors. The resulting litigation, Lynch v. Board of Equali-
zation,90 was decided by the trial court in 1981, and in 1985 at the
appellate level. 91 This lengthy process underlines the problems asses-
roll in full and two allocate the residences in question between nonexempt residential uses and
exempt education uses. See Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d
496, 314 P.2d 209 (1957).
89. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
90. 164 Cal. App. 3d 94, 210 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1985).
91. The impact in Kern County, had Lynch been decided in favor of the oil companies,
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sors and taxpayers have in attempting to resolve the ambiguities in
the provisions of articles XIII and XIIIA. They are constitutional,*
and cannot be finally resolved at the local, State Board or even
legislative level. Only four votes on the California Supreme Court
achieve final certainty.92
Assessors and taxpayers are faced with an even more difficult
situation when the Legislature and the State Board fail to act to
resolve ambiguous concepts. Again, Proposition 13 situations are
illustrative. Revenue and Taxation Code section 71, an early legis-
lative provision implementing Proposition 13, is ambiguous with
regard to the treatment of multi-year construction projects. Many
assessors believed that legislative intent and good appraisal practice
required waiting until the final completion of the project and then
doing a unitary appraisal of the entire improvement. State Board
staff issued a contrary instruction to assessors in 1980, calling for
separate appraisal of each portion of the project as it is completed.9"This "Assessors' letter" was litigated in Los Angeles County and an
appellate decision was rendered in favor of the State Board.9 Efforts
by assessors to secure legislation settling this issue in favor of their
position were unsuccessful, due in no small part to the vigorous
opposition by State Board staff in the Legislature. 9 Even so, the
State Board itself has never adopted a rule resolving the matter. 96
would have been catastrophic. The "Oil Roll" in Kern County is currently approximately $15billion. About $9 billion of that roll segment would have been eliminated if the position ofthe oil companies had been adopted (approximately one-third of the County's entire assessment
roll).
92. Six justices were on the November 4, 1986 ballot for confirmation. Three were
rejected. Needless to say, the philosophical view point of the Court may be substantially
impacted by that result.
93. State Board, Letter to Assessors, 80/77 (May 8, 1980) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal).
94. Pope v. State Bd. of Equalization, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 194 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1983).95. Language favoring the County's position was originally part of Senate Bill 1108 (laterdeleted), and also part of Assembly Bill 3358 (Floyd) and Senate Bill 1231 (McCorquodale),
all in the 1983-84 Regular Session of the State Legislature.
96. A similar problem exists eight years after passage of Proposition 13 with regard tothe term "major rehabilitation," which triggers reappraisal under Revenue and Taxation Code§ 71. State Board rules do not define "major rehabilitation" in specific terms. State Boardguidelines distinguish "major rehabilitation" from correction of "deferred maintenance" and
suggest the use of an "85% good" standard. Assessors are unsure as to the exact meaning ofthose terms, particularly as applied to relatively new improvements (which may be close to
"85% good" at all times and often already exceed their existing assessed values with or
without the construction work at issue). One large county relies largely on an "extension of
economic life" standard. Another requires a value increase of at least 50%. Many counties
simply leave the matter to "appraisal judgment." As in the case of multi-year new construction,
the courts may have to deal with this problem by default.
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Similarly, some commercial property owners have attempted to use
the broad language of Revenue and Taxation Code section 62(e) as
a basis for asserting that major sale and leaseback transactions are
not "changes in ownership" under Proposition 13. The State Board
has issued contrary instructions. 97 Assessors were able to secure the
passage of legislation supporting the State Board position, at least
prospectively.98 This legislation, however, was vetoed by the Governor
and the matter remains up in the air in the absence of a State Board
rule (or future legislation) resolving the issue once and for all.
B. Technical and Arbitrary
As with federal income tax law, property tax rules are frequently
technical and arbitrary and not subject to common sense analysis.
For example, the articles of incorporation of nonprofit corporations
must follow a certain format prescribed by the State Board or risk
not securing the exemption to which they would normally be enti-
tled.99 As well advised an entity as the Los Angeles Olympic Organ-
izing Committee had problems with its exemption status because of
difficulties with its articles of incorporation.
The change-in-ownership provisions enacted by the Legislature and
the accompanying rules adopted by the State Board to implement
section 2(a) of Proposition 13 are replete with arbitary requirements
that frequently result in unintended or inconsistent property tax
consequences. The following examples are illustrative:
1. Spousal Transfers. -The State Board and the legislature have been
unable to decide whether spouses should be treated as two persons
or as a single entity for change-in-ownership purposes. Pursuant to
Revenue and Taxation Code section 63, transfers of property between
spouses are not subject to reappraisal, apparently on the theory that
the family is a single economic entity. However, State Board instruc-
tions provide that if spouses purchase all the shares of a stock there
is no reappraisal, apparently on the opposite theory that spouses are
separate individuals and neither one has acquired more than fifty per-
cent of the shares. 00
97. State Board, Letter to Assessors, 85/128 (Dec. 5, 1985) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal).
98. A.B. 2528, 1985-86 Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (vetoed Sept. 12, 1986).
99. CAL. Rsv. & TAX CODE §§ 214.01, 254.5 (1970); CAL. ST. BD. EQUAL. PROP. TAX R.
136, CAL. Am. CODE tit. 18, § 136 (1987).
100. CAL. Rav. & TAx. CODE § 63 (West Supp. 1987); State Board, Letters to Assessors,
83/17 (July 15, 1983), and 85/33 (Mar. 5, 1985) (copies on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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2. Tenancy in Common Versus Joint Tenancy.-Joint tenants may
be added or removed from title without reappraisal consequences as
long as the original owner(s) remain as joint tenants. The same
transactions done by tenants in common would each cause partial
reappraisals."° ' Lay persons attempting simply to add or subtract family
members to and from title frequently run afoul of this distinction.
3. Legal Entity Rules.-The rules governing legal entities are par-
ticularly technical and need careful analysis to be sure of the property
tax consequences of a complex transaction. For example, if one
corporation is acquired by another corporation, the real property of
the acquired corporation is reappraised. However, if a group of
entities (or persons) makes the acquisition, with no one of them
obtaining over a fifty percent interest, there is no reappraisal. 02
4. Step Transactions.-If two persons own property and transfer a
one-third interest to another person, that one-third interest will be
reappraised. However, if the two original owners form a corporation,
transfer the property to the corporation, transfer one-third of the
shares of the corporation to the other person, and then dissolve the
corporation with all three sharing equally in the property, reappraisal
can be avoided. This procedure could be reversed to avoid reappraisal
when ownership is to be reduced from three owners to two owners. 03
Perhaps the most egregious example of an arbitrary requirement
in connection with Proposition 13 is the first amendment to the
Proposition, passed in the fall of 1978, which provides for special
assessment rules for properties affected by disaster "as declared by
the Governor."' 1 The unreasonableness of that constitutional restric-
tion has resulted in its being totally ignored. The sections of the
Revenue and Taxation Code and the State Board rules implementing
the disaster provisions both omit the quoted limitation and provide
101. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 62(0, 65 (Vest Supp. 1987).
102. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 64(c) (West Supp. 1987); CAL. ST. BD. EQUAL. PROP. TAX
R. 4620), CAL. ADnImI. CODE tit. 18, § 4620) (1987).
103. Opinion letter, from Eric F. Eisenlauer, State Board Tax Counsel, to Gary W. Maeder,
Esq., Sept. 9, 1986 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal). The inter-spousal transfer exclusion
could be used in a similar way to avoid reappraisal. Suppose a father wishes to transfer
property to his son. He could go through a marriage ceremony with the son's fiance, transfer
the property to her and then divorce her. No reappraisal. She could then marry the son and
transfer the property to him. Again, no reappraisal. Examples like these give some credence
to the comment of one prominent Los Angeles property tax lawyer who stated that he could
structure any transfer to avoid a change-in-ownership reappraisal.
104. November 1978 California Ballot Pamphlet, Proposition Eight (now part of CAL.
CoNsr. art. XIIIA, § 2(a)).
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relief to all properties affected by disasters, with or without the
gubernatorial declaration. 05
C. Complex and Overlapping
Probably the best example of overlap involves property used for
church purposes which may qualify for either the Church Exemption,
the Religious Exemption, or the Welfare Exemption. For the most
part, this is a distinction without a difference, but not always. For
example, the Religious Exemption has a one-time only filing require-
ment while the Church and Welfare Exemptions require annual filings
and may be lost if filing dates are missed.1°6 Also, the two latter
exemptions require both ownership and use while the Church Ex-
emption sometimes only requires use, a vital distinction in the case
of leased property. 0 7 Obviously, a thorough knowledge of these
niceties is necessary if the owners of potentially exempt property are
to be able to take maximum advantage of existing law.
An excellent example of factual complexity in a particular case is
the opinion of the State Board segregating the exempt from the
nonexempt uses of the Crystal Cathedral property in Orange County.
In its decision in that case dealing with the 1979-82 period, the State
Board disallowed claimed exemptions for thirty-seven rooms and part
of the sanctuary in the Cathedral itself for 1982, all of the Fellowship
Hall for 1982 and areas in the Hall used by a profit-making corpora-
tion for 1979-81, most of the Arboretum for 1982 and Arboretum
areas used by the for-profit corporation during 1979-81, a bookstore
for 1980-82, and areas used by the for-profit corporation on three
floors of the Hour of Power Building in 1979-81.1°8 Obviously, church
officials and the Orange County Office of Assessor have their work
105. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 51(c) (West Supp. 1986); CAL. ST. BD. EQUAL. PROP. TAX
R. 461, CAL. ADsmm. CODE tit. 18, § 461 (1987).
106. STATE BOARD, PROPERTY TAX INFORMATION FOR CHURCH EXEMPTIONS, RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE WELFARE EXEMPTION (Aug. 1986) (copy on file
at Pacific Law Journal). Notwithstanding the filing deadline, Revenue and Taxation Code
§ 270 permits late filing. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 270 (West supp. 1987).
107. See PROPERTY TAX INFORMATION FOR CHURCH EXEMPTIONS, supra note 106, at 1.
108. In re Crystal Cathedral of the Reformed Church in America, Cal. St. Bd. Equal.
(Feb. 29, 1984) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal). In Society for Krishna Consciousness
v. County of Los Angeles, the trial court granted a partial exemption based on a time allocation
of the use of the premises in question. The practical difficulty of applying any such standard
is obvious. The taxpayer conceded as much and did not pursue that argument on appeal. 112
Cal. App. 3d 582 (1980) (opinion not officially published).
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cut out for them in keeping proper track of the many activities on
the Cathedral property in the future.
A complex situation involving an entire line of business arose
subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages,109 which removed the property tax immunity
previously accorded to imports. Assessors reacted, following the
advice of the State Board, by levying escape assessments on importers
for all years within the statute of limitations. Importers sought and
obtained legislative relief in the form of Revenue and Taxation Code
section 226 which prohibited the retroactive application of Michelin.
Los Angeles County, having made numerous early assessments in
anticipation of Michelin, in turn secured an amendment to section
226 allowing retroactive assessments already made where "it would
be equitable to do so." The fairness of this exception was, needless
to say, attacked in court, and the court of appeal held in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. County of Los Angeles,"0 that section 226 should
not be applied when the taxpayer believed that its goods were immune
and priced them accordingly. The difficulties of applying this sub-jective standard are obvious. Fortunately for property tax adminis-
trators, the 1980 action of the Legislature granting a 100% exemption
to business inventory has eliminated the possibility of further prob-
lems in this area.
The provisions governing whether or not changes in the ownership
of legal entities trigger the reappraisal of the real property owned by
those entities involve both theoretical and factual complexity. The
Legislature failed to choose between the entity theory and the ultimate
ownership theory of ownership in Revenue and Taxation Code sec-
tions 61, 62, and 64. For some purposes, the corporation and
partnership entities are treated as the owners of their taxable property,
and for other purposes the stockholders and partners are treated as
the owners. The same lack of consistency is contained in State Board
rule 462(j), one of the most complex subdivisions of the State Board's
change-in-ownership rule. However, these theoretical problems in the
underlying legal provisions pale in comparison to the difficuty of
applying them to the complex commercial society in which we live.
For example, in one Los Angeles County case, an Assessment Appeals
Board held that a forty percent change in ownership had occurred
in a situation that called for either a one hundred percent reappraisal
109. 423 U.S. 276 (1976). See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
110. 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1978).
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or none. The complexity of the ownership interests in question was
so great that the county and the taxpayer accepted that result rather
than pursue the matter to trial in the Superior Court."'
D. Expensive to Administer
Needless to say, this complex system of exemptions, exclusions,
restrictions and immunities is cumbersome and expensive to admin-
ister. The Exemption Section of the Los Angeles County Office of
Assessor has ninety-two employees and a total budget of $1.2 million.
In addition, approximately forty employees are engaged in public
service and roll adjustment activities related to these limitations, at
an annual cost in excess of $1 million. The statewide cost of similar
activities in all assessors' offices would be at least three times as
much, plus approximately one percent of the $122 million expended
by the State Board in 1984-1985.112 The cost to the private sector of
complying with the legal requirements is probably at least as large.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
A simple and orderly system of exemptions and other limitations
for California's property tax is too much to hope for in the foresee-
able future. As with many of our tax rules, special interest groups
of all sorts find tax exemptions and exclusions the easiest way
politically to obtain governmental support. Subsidies that would be
objectionable, if not unconstitutional, as appropriations from the
public treasury are much easier to achieve through property tax
exemptions. Many sessions of the Assembly and Senate Revenue and
Taxation Committees are largely taken up with proposals for new
exemptions which would receive short shrift-as budget items in the
Assembly and Senate fiscal committees. Once in, exemptions are hard
to remove, as any member of the Legislature (or any politician
(fool)hardy enough to suggest the possibility of making any substan-
tial change in Proposition 13) can attest. Hence the more modest
recommendations for reform set forth below; any one of which
111. Hexalon v. County of Los Angeles, Civ. Case No. 516-403 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.,
Jan. 15, 1985). See also Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. County of Riverside, Civ. Case No. 144-
292 (Riverside Super. Ct., Jan. 15, 1985). In that case, a Superior Court Judge refused to
follow the requirement of State Board rule 462(j) that changes in ownership of a parent
corporation also apply to its subsidiaries on the basis that CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 64(c)
does not expressly require that result.
112. This cost is estimated at 25% of the total State Board Assessment Standards expend-
iture. SBE ANN. REP., supra note 1, at A-3.
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would be a major step in the direction of better public understanding
and less expensive administration of California's property tax system.
A. Sunsetting
With the revenue loss from exemptions and other limitations as
large as it is, the most obvious general approach would be to abolish
them all and lower Proposition 13's basic one percent rate by a
corresponding amount. In theory, this approach would have great
appeal since the reduction would exceed thirty percent. A two-thirds
of one percent rate applied to all privately-owned tangible property
in California would generate as much revenue as the existing property
tax structure does today.13
As with all tax reform proposals, the political realities intrude.
Despite the fact that some of our founding fathers may have thought
property tax exemption for churches an unconstitutional subsidy of
religion, the religious exemption has a 200 year history that is hardly
likely to be terminated any time soon. 14 Similarly, the budgets of
many private schools, hospitals, and other nonprofit institutions
would be severely strained by having to pay property tax, and these
organizations would not be wanting for champions against any effort
to remove their exemptions.
As a practical matter, the most that could be hoped for in this
area would probably be a sunset procedure in which exemptions
would terminate unless renewed by a vote of the Legislature or the
people every so often. This procedure might eliminate some of the
more archaic exemptions, and would at least help to underline the
"cost" of the present system to the legislators and voters on a regular
basis." 5
113. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
114. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1969), the United States Supreme Court
found that the legislative purpose of property tax exemptions for churches was neither the
advancement nor the inhibition of religion. Accordingly, the Court held that such exemptionsdo not violate the first amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 672-80.
115. California has been making slow progress in this area for a number of years. In 1971
the Legislature directed the Department of Finance to report every two years on the "tax
expenditures" in the state's tax structure (defined as deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions,
and preferential rates). 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1762, at 3810-11. This report was made a part of
the Governor's Budget in 1977. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 575, sec. 2, at 1416. In 1985, the Legislatureprovided the report be made on an annual basis. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 268, sec. 23.5, at 71;
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13305 (West Supp. 1987). The report, however, is lacking in completeness
since it does not generally include constitutional provisions, and will exclude "general tax
expenditures" in the future. See 1986-87 California Governor's Budget, at 83 (Jan. 10,
1987 / Property Tax Exemptions
B. Regular Reappraisal of Business Property
Any effort to change the rollback and freeze provisions of Prop-
osition 13 as applied to homeowners appears not to be politically
feasible for the foreseeable future.'1 6 A more realistic proposal in
this area might be the regular reappraisal of business property as
initially suggested last year by the Governor's Tax Reform Commis-
sion.'1 7 With regard to the fairness of limiting regular reappraisal to
business property, most residential property turns over regularly and
is generally reappraised at least once a generation on the death of
the owners." 8 In contrast, business property is normally owned by
corporations and partnerships and may never be reappraised. More-
over, residential property is bought primarily for its use value to the
owner, which does not change over time. Business property, on the
other hand, generally generates income which does, in most cases,
increase with inflation over the long run.
Regular reappraisal of business property would equalize the prop-
erty tax base of competitors (now often glaringly divergent) and
enable the Legislature to repeal the most complex of the change-in-
ownership rules. This scheme could be made revenue-neutral by being
coupled with the repeal of the property tax on business personal
property (the least cost-effective aspect of the current property tax
system), and with the inclusion of limits on the percentage of
increased taxes for reappraised property in any one year.
C. Administrative Simplifications
All property tax exemptions could be consolidated into a single
general exemption which, once granted, would not require annual
renewal. The sole requirement would be use by organizations
1986). The Legislature has gone one step further and directed the Legislative Analyst to
establish a process for reviewing all "tax exceptions" (similarly defined) with a view toward
the possible preparation of a "Tax Exception Budget Revision Bill" in each general session
of the Legislature. 1985 Cal. Stat. res. ch. 70, at _ .
116. Proposition 13 continues to have overwhelming public support. See CALIFORNIA AND THE
AmiamcAN TAX REvOLT: PROPOSITON 13 FrE YEARS LATER (T. Schwadron ed. 1984); Ryavec
& Dougherty, Putting Fairness Back Into Proposition 13, Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Feb.
13, 1985, at A13.
117. TAX REFOR ADvisORY CoMMssIo N REPORT, at 49-52 (Feb. 11, 1985).
118. However, Proposition 58, approved by the voters in the 1986 General Election,
eliminates reappraisal for most property transfers between parents and children. November
1986 California Ballot Pamphlet, Proposition 58 (now CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(g)-(i)).
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entitled to specified income tax exemptions under federal or state law." 9
To reduce possible abuse, the consolidated reporting form could
require a declaration under penalty of perjury that the property is
being used solely for the exempt purpose, and organizations could
be required to report when the exempt use was terminated, with
substantial penalties for failure to report. A regular audit rotation
could be established to check compliance. This procedure could be
administered locally, as are other property tax matters, without the
current necessity of procuring final decisions at the State Board level
in Sacramento.
The Homeowners' Exemption should be excepted from any such
procedure. Responsibility for administering the Homeowners' Ex-
emption could be shifted to the State Franchise Tax Board. Eligible
homeowners would simply check a box on their state income tax
returns and be entitled to a standard credit. This procedure would
not only save the large administrative costs incurred in administering
the Homeowners' Exemption programs by the counties, but would
also eliminate the State Board computerized cross-checking procedure
for the purpose of preventing multiple Homeowners' Exemption
claims by individuals owning properties in more than one county.
Alternatively, all single-family dwelling units might simply be given
an automatic equivalent exemption.
VI. CONCLUSION
The size and complexity of the present system of property tax
limitations and the political muscle of the affected organizations
make reform of the system difficult. Reform would require a con-
centrated effort by property tax administrators, legislators and staff,
and interested organizations, such as the State Bar, perhaps aided
by the Law Revision Commission, to achieve success. Despite the
cumbersome nature of the present system and its expense to admin-
ister, the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" philosophy is likely to
prevail over all but the most determined reform efforts. Unfortu-
nately, a major scandal or public perception of wide-spread abuse is
probably the necessary precursor of significant reform in this area.
119. See CAL. Rav. & TAx CODE § 214.8 (West Supp. 1987). This new section requires
that all Welfare Exemption organizations provide an exemption letter from either the Internal
Revenue Service or the State Franchise Tax Board. Id.
